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Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘Soft Power’ has become an increasingly used term to 
help explain why states – including so-called ‘emerging states’ – are paying 
greater attention towards acquiring various forms of cultural and political 
attraction. However, within mainstream International Relations, Political 
Science, and Sport Studies literature, a continuous debate remains as to what 
actually constitutes soft power, how national leaders go about acquiring it, and 
how forms of attraction convert into power outcomes in both the short- and 
long-term. This paper endeavours to overcome these issues by offering an 
‘Ideal-Type’ model which details states’ soft power strategies, the mechanisms 
they use, and the tangible future outcomes they gain. The paper is separated 
into five sections. First the concept of soft power is introduced and its 
contribution, application and limitations are critically evaluated. Second, 
crucial background information on the various national authorities engaged 
with to arrive at the ideal type is offered, along with a discussion of the 
research methods used. Third, the paper advances an ideal-type model of a 
state’s soft power strategy, explicitly detailing, in the process, the 
considerations and rationale behind the design. Fourth, empirical data 
gathered by the authors around Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup and Qatar’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup is used as ‘test 
cases’ to show the utility of the ideal-type. The paper concludes by reflecting 
on the contribution this model makes to current literature and how it could be 
used in future research.    
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Introduction  
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’1 by 
scholars and commentators attempting to explain why states – including so-called ‘emerging 
states’ – are seeking to acquire various forms of cultural and political attraction. However, within 
mainstream international relations, political science, and sport studies literature, a continuous 
debate remains as to what actually constitutes soft power, how national leaders go about 
acquiring it, and how forms of attraction convert into power outcomes in both the short- and 
long-term. The intention of this piece is to move beyond a discussion of Joseph Nye’s concept 
of ‘soft power’ towards an ‘ideal type’ of a state’s soft power strategy that can be used in future 
empirical research – sporting and otherwise. One of the problems with Nye’s work – and much 
of the academic discourse it has inspired – is that debates remain lofty, concepts slippery and 
theories opaque, rendering their use in actual research difficult. Nonetheless, instead of 
jettisoning the concept ‘soft power’, this article seeks to empirically ground it through developing 
a heuristic device that researchers can use to analyse a variety of cases. In previous work the 
authors have critiqued the term, but came to the conclusion that ‘Joseph Nye clearly put his 
finger on something when coining the concept of “soft power”— there has evidently been a 
shift in attempts to manipulate the “politics of attraction” in international affairs among states of 
all political hues’.2 The originality of the current paper lies in its attempt to build out from the 
authors’ empirical studies of sport diplomacy to construct an ‘ideal type’ that can be used by 
researchers to analyse further case studies to understand the components of states’ soft power 
strategies.  
As part of the strategic shift from employing ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ power (see below for more on this), 
states have increasingly used sport in general and sports mega-events (SMEs) in particular. The 
latter are often used as broad-brush diplomatic tools to increase a state’s international prestige, 
improve an often tarnished image and increase the likelihood of the host state’s acceptance on 
the world stage. As such, this paper draws on two sports-related examples to exemplify the utility 
of the ideal type. SMEs are seen by the majority of regime types as part of their wider diplomatic 
armoury and by their very nature these events cut across all of the areas identified by the authors 
which are considered important for generating soft power (see below). This is significant, as 
current debates tend to focus on semantics or fail to engage with the concept, rather than 
providing a conceptual framework with which to attempt to understand a state’s soft power 
strategy.  
The paper unfolds with an introduction and discussion of the available literature on soft power 
in its wider and sporting contexts. As will become clear, the majority of such work has refrained 
from confronting many of Nye’s conceptual limitations. Prior to introducing the ideal type, a 
section on the research methods and sources used in its construction is explained. The idea here 
is to indicate the data types and analyses used in empirical attempts to understand soft power. It 
is from such studies that significant insights have fed into the model. In introducing an ideal 
type, flesh is added to the theoretical bones of much of this debate by highlighting the 
mechanisms national governments and relevant stakeholders draw on to acquire soft power. The 
next step in this paper is to apply this abstract model briefly to two real-life test-cases 
(Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Qatar’s sport diplomacy, including the 
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acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup) to illustrate its potential.3 The possible pitfalls of any 
soft power strategy are also highlighted. The piece concludes by detailing how the ideal type 
might be used in future research to help further identify and explain the mechanisms through 
which a state can acquire soft power.    
‘Soft Power’: concept, debate and limitations  
The concept of ‘soft power’ was coined in 1990 by the American political scientist, Joseph Nye. 
For Nye, the ‘power’ side of the concept denotes one’s ability to ‘effect the outcomes you want, 
and, if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen’.4 For twenty-first 
century leaders, Nye suggests political outcomes can be achieved through an amalgamation of 
both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power strategies.5 On the one hand, states may draw upon forms of ‘hard 
power’, through, for example, capitalizing on military force or offering economic rewards; on the 
other, they may choose to indirectly adapt the political agenda in such a way which shapes the 
preferences of others through, for instance, emulating one’s ‘intangible assets’: attractive culture, 
innovative ideologies, and/or credible and commendable institutions, values and policies.6 It is 
this latter approach which Nye calls ‘soft power’: ‘the ability to achieve goals through attraction 
rather than coercion’7. Such attraction converts into power outcomes when those on the 
receiving end of the soft power strategy look to the state producing it for affirmation, guidance 
and leadership, or seek to imitate their domestic and/or international achievements.8 
This is, however, not to suggest that soft power should replace the utilization of hard power – 
in-fact national leaders should, whenever possible, endeavour to combine the soft dimension of 
attraction with the hard dimensions of coercion and inducement (what Nye terms ‘smart 
power’)9. Rather, Nye advocates that nation-states should take greater advantage of the former.10 
Nye’s rationale for this is three fold. First, since the end of the Cold War, nation-states have 
become far more concerned with forms of welfare over military glory, whereby, in the modern 
era, national leaders need greater public support before engaging in forceful pursuits.11 Second, 
for the majority of states, the use of force severely jeopardizes their economic objectives and 
ability to maintain international competitiveness.12 Finally, the increasing influence of the 
information revolution and globalization has led to states’ behaviour coming under closer 
scrutiny than ever before. The result is that the use of force has become less tolerated in post-
industrial (and, in particular, advanced capitalist) societies, leading to the increasing importance 
of soft forms of power.13 
The significance of the concept is demonstrated most evidently through the increasing number 
of academics, politicians and governmental authorities, private institutions and agencies, and 
journalists and blog writers that have attempted to apply, adapt and/or measure soft power in 
their discussions of state-led policies. A good example from the latter group is Susie Mesure of 
The Independent who classifies the global obsession with K-pop music as a significant cog in South 
Korean’s soft power offensive, one which has seen the state successfully overtake rivals Japan as 
Asia’s ‘coolest child’;14 Takashi Umekawa from Reuters identifies the Japan Foreign Ministry’s 
plan to inject $15 million into the funding of Japanese studies and research at overseas 
universities as a clear push for enhanced ‘soft power’, one which is greatly helping internationally 
promote ‘Japan Brand’;15 and, finally, Roula Khalaf of the Financial Times grounds the United 
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Kingdom’s decision to commit a new fund towards the protection of historic property after Isis’s 
‘cultural war’ and subsequent destruction of ancient sites in Syria as a significant soft power 
coup, a decision which has been praised by numerous Syrians who are determined to safeguard 
their ‘identity and existence’.16 
A second group consists of politicians and governmental authorities who have referred to soft 
power in speeches and various state policies. Prominent examples include Hillary Clinton’s 
reference to both soft power and smart power at the 2013 Council for Foreign Relations in 
Washington, DC;17 the UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s description of Britain’s place in the 
world as a ‘soft power super power’ in a speech on the importance of Scotland to the UK at the 
Olympic Park in East London in 2014;18 and, finally, the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
Communist Party address in Beijing in 2014 where he singled out the importance of raising 
China’s soft power reach as well as the need to better communicate the country’s message to the 
world.19 With regard to governments and soft power,  a good example is the workshop dedicated 
to the use of smart power at the U.S. Department of State’s Third Annual Conference on 
Program Evaluation in 2010;20 the British Parliament’s 2013 establishment of its ‘Committee on 
Soft Power and the UK’s Influence’, which led to the publication of two extensive volumes in 
March 201421; and the centrality of soft power in the Australian Government’s ‘Public 
Diplomacy Strategy 2014-16’, which lays out the state’s plans to significantly increase ‘trade, 
investment and economic prosperity promotion’.22  
The third group identified by the authors consists of a number of private institutions and 
agencies who are concerned with measuring a state’s soft power reach. These include the UK 
based Monocle Media Group, who, in collaboration with the UK Institute for Government, 
publish their annual ‘Soft Power Survey’, ranking the top thirty countries worldwide based on 
their culture, cuisine, sport, governance and diplomacy;23 Portland Communication’s yearly ‘the 
Soft Power 30’, which attempts to measure the soft power properties and subsequent public 
opinion of states, positioning the top thirty countries based on their diplomatic networks, 
cultural impact, governmental ideologies, level of education, digital infrastructure, and economic 
capacity;24 Ernst and Young Global Limited’s year on year ‘Rapid-Growth Markets Soft Power 
Index’, which looks to measure the leading twenty countries based on their global integrity, 
global integration and global image;25 and finally, although not referring directly to soft power, is 
Anholt-GfK’s ‘Nation Brand Index’, which grades the top fifty nations on public opinion 
acquired from 20,000 citizens in twenty countries on how they perceive a state’s people, 
products, culture, government, education, lifestyle and tourism.26 
The fourth and most dominant group consists of academics who have applied Nye’s concept in 
their attempt to theorize various state-led pursuits. In the field of international relations, for 
example, numerous scholars have argued that China is currently engaged in a soft power 
offensive through the promotion of its Confucius Institutes abroad, its involvement in United 
Nations peacekeeping missions and various humanitarian efforts, as well as the rise and 
international reach of its media outlets, Central China Television (CCTV) and Xinhua News 
Agency;27 furthermore, many have claimed that India’s rising international reputation for 
excellence in film, business and technology equates to a drive for soft power;28 likewise, Brazil is 
said to be engaged in a soft power strategy through its leading role in successfully negotiating 
6 
 
multiple international agreements related to public health, as well as its position as the world’s 
largest aid donors;29 and it has been argued that Turkey exerts significant soft power across the 
Arab world due its recent democratization efforts across the region, its economic success, rising 
credibility and shared heritage.30 Finally, Russia is said to have ‘failed to capitalize on the soft-
power boost afforded to Russia by hosting the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi’, according 
to Joseph Nye,31 although this is, as Golubchikov32 states, a ‘reductionist’ account of the use of 
this SME as a signal of Russia’s growing power.  
As with most mainstream concepts, the time-lag is fairly long before soft power begins to appear 
in sports studies literature and analyses. ‘Social capital’ took some 6 years from Putnam’s 
successful 2000 book, Bowling Alone, to enter sport studies;33 ‘soft power’ has taken even longer. 
Within the sports studies literature it took some 20 years for the concept to gain traction. In 
general, the use of the concept has been most prevalent by those scholars who attempt to 
explain the global lure of hosting both first-order (FIFA World Cup; Olympic Games) and 
second-order (Rugby World Cup; Commonwealth Games) SMEs. Some of the most notable 
work here can be found through the examples of Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup;34 Beijing’s staging of the 2008 Olympic Games;35 the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South 
Africa;36 the 2011 Rugby World Cup in New Zealand;37 the London 2012 Olympics;38 Brazil’s 
‘double hosting’ of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games;39 Sochi’s delivery of 
the 2014 Winter Olympic Games;40 and Qatar’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup41. In 
most cases, hosting a successful SME is thought to lead to enhanced soft power that can make a 
state’s culture and political values more attractive to others, thus improving the image or ‘brand’ 
of the host and/or signalling their emerging status as a key international actor.42 In short, sport is 
no longer just a niche cultural institution for national governments to consider employing 
domestically, but rather a highly relevant foreign policy tool.43 
One could be forgiven for presuming that with the quantity of commentators making use of 
Nye’s concept - across the four groups outlined – an excellent heuristic device with which to 
help explain how and why states engage in the “politics of attraction” on the international stage 
would have been developed. Unfortunately, although the concept has shed some light on why 
states undertake a soft power strategy (for international prestige/increased trade etc.), little has 
been discussed on the ‘how’. Indeed, despite its growing significance, many have strongly 
criticized Nye’s work44. Through these authors’ attempts to unpick, understand and extend soft 
power theoretically, Nye’s original concept has been, and, more importantly, continues to be, 
questioned on four specific levels: first, many have raised concerns over what soft power actually 
is, and, more specifically, whether it is merely another buzzword for conceptualizing that of 
nation branding and/or place marketing;45 second, many have suggested that Nye fails to deliver 
a clear description of how one actually acquires ‘soft power’ or forms of attraction, leading to the 
concept becoming highly confusing and problematic to work with;46 third, due to Nye’s reliance 
on discussions of the West, many equate soft power as being either too structural or Western-
centric;47 and finally, some have argued that greater academic attention is needed in identifying 
and highlighting the potential pitfalls for any state that attempts to acquire soft power forms.48 
In responding to the first criticism above, Nye himself - along with others - has been quick to 
remind us that soft power should not merely be considered another term for place 
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marketing/nation branding.49 As Nye has been at pains to advocate, soft power is not simply the 
ability to persuade; it is the ability to entice and attract, leading to acquiescence and imitation. 
Considering this, if a state’s culture, values and/or policies are not themselves authentically 
attractive, no soft power outcomes will be gained;50 soft power cannot be achieved through slick 
marketing and/or branding, but emanates from, above all else, credibility – a value which simple 
propaganda and/or public relations campaigns often lack.51 In agreement with Nye, we would 
argue that although selling a positive image of oneself is a significant part of public diplomacy, 
for soft power to work, leaders need to, first-and-foremost, build long-term relationships based 
on trust and credibility, eventually leading to an enabling environment for effective government 
policies. Given this, the authors agree with Nye that soft power aligns itself more to public 
diplomacy than nation building and/or place marketing;52 indeed, successful soft power requires 
regular and equal communication with foreign audiences, ‘listening as well as [simply] talking’.53 
Unfortunately, however, Nye fails to offer much in the way of a solution to the remaining three 
criticisms levelled towards him. This contribution to the literature seeks to redress this in part by: 
setting out tangible areas in which states acquire soft power; offering empirical examples of real-
life cases to show what soft power acquisition looks like in practice; using a non-Western case 
study to illustrate that soft power transcends geographical localities. There is limited space here 
to discuss in-depth the Janus-faced nature of a soft power strategy that relies on large, one-off, 
SMEs, but the authors have discussed this in detail elsewhere.54 In the following sections, 
therefore, the focus is on presenting an ‘ideal type’ that goes some way to identifying how states 
actually go about acquiring soft power forms, the mechanisms involved, and how these convert 
into long-term outcomes. This is achieved by drawing on the empirical examples of one Western 
state (Germany and its hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup) and one non-Western state 
(Qatar’s sport diplomacy) in order to identify the universal applicability of soft power.  
Methods 
The ideal-type put-forward in the subsequent section is derived from empirical work conducted 
over a four year period by the authors with national authorities in Europe, South America and 
the Middle East.55 In addition, the authors have generated knowledge as part of a multi-state 
research project on the leveraging strategies adopted by countries hosting mega-events in an 
attempt to produce tangible ‘legacies’, including, amongst others, showcasing their nation, 
improving their national image and putting themselves on the international map.56 The following 
is indicative of the range of sources drawn upon which fed into the development of the idea 
type. Both studies of Germany and Qatar have been published in full elsewhere (see endnote 3).   
After ethical approval (Universities of Birmingham/Loughborough), the data collection strategy 
occurred in two stages. The first included the continued collection and analysis of documents 
between 2011 and 2015 in connection to the foreign policy and soft power objectives of German 
and Qatari authorities. In selecting  documents, only those published directly by state authorities 
or state-subsidiaries (e.g. national tourist boards, national governing bodies/sporting committees, 
etc.) were included in the final sample. Thus, in order to ensure the content of each document 
resembled the objectives of the state, any and all documents not directly derived from German 
and Qatari authorities were excluded. In adhering to this inclusion-exclusion criterion, the final 
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document sample resembled that depicted in Table 1 (below). The document analysis guided the 
construction of interview schedules and interviews with state officials.57 
Country Included Document Sources  
Germany 
- German Federal Government Reports; 
- German Federal Ministry of Interior 
Reports; 
- German Tourist Board; 
- Germany ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign; 
- 2006 World Cup Organising Committee. 
Qatar 
- Qatar General Secretariat for Development 
Planning; 
- 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery and 
Legacy; 
- Aspire Academy for Sports Excellence; 
- Qatar Supreme Council for Health; 
- International Centre for Sports Security; 
Table 1: Document Inclusion-Exclusion Criterion 
The second stage of our data collection strategy included semi-structured interviews with key 
officials in Germany and the State of Qatar between 2011 and 2015. The ability of semi-
structured interviews to produce the most in-depth accounts of specific phenomena, as well as 
combine the flexibility of unstructured techniques with more focused, structured-like forms, led 
to the decision to use this form of interviewing.58 Key organizations and personnel were chosen 
in line with the study’s aims and objectives (see Table 2)59 and all participants were required to be 
over the age of 18 years old.  
Participant must work for state-run/funded organization; 
Participant must work in relevant department (foreign policy, tourism, sports 
policy/development, public relations, etc.) within state organization; 
Participant must hold a certain level of expertise within organization 
(Director, Manager, Senior Official, Committee Member, officer/analyst, 
etc.); 
Participant must be over 18 years of age. 
Table 2: Interview Inclusion Criterion 
As shown in Table 3, the final interview sample included: the German Foreign Office; the 
‘Germany: Land of Ideas’ campaign, the state’s core place-branding initiative set-up by to 
showcase Germany’s culture, politics and business; the German Football Federation and the 
FIFA 2006 Organising Committee, the organizations responsible for successfully delivering and 
maintaining the legacy of the 2006 FIFA World Cup; the Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee for 
Delivery and Legacy, the organization responsible for the organization, delivery and maintenance 
of Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup legacy; the International Centre for Sports Security, the 
organization responsible for showcasing Qatar’s international commitment to integrity, security 
and safety through sport; the Aspire Academy of Sports Excellence, the organization responsible 
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for training and development of aspiring athletes; the Qatar National Health Strategy, the 
organization responsible for achieving Qatar’s desire to occupy a world-leading healthcare 
system; and, Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Program, the centre responsible for the promotion 
of international collaborative education and research.  
Country Interviewee(s)  
Germany 
- Two Foreign Policy & Communications 
officers from the German Foreign Office; 
- The Chief Executive of ‘Germany: Land of 
Ideas’; 
- The Secretary General of the German 
Football Federation and the Vice President 
of the FIFA 2006 Organising Committee. 
Qatar 
- Supreme Committee member and one 
Public Relations and Communications 
Director from the Qatar 2022 Supreme 
Committee for Delivery and Legacy; 
- Public Relations Manager of the 
International Centre for Sports Security; 
- Public Relations Director and the Head of 
Sport Development at the Aspire Academy 
of Sports Excellence; 
- The Director of the Qatar National Health 
Strategy; 
- The Director of Research of Qatar 
University’s Gulf Studies Program. 
Table 3: Interviewee positions and organizations 
Data was subjected to a thorough thematic analysis through first, reading and re-reading of 
documents and transcribed interviews; second, generating ‘initial codes’ which identified parts of 
the data found most significant; third, identifying the various relationships that existed between 
these initial codes, which allowed the authors to begin the process of creating overarching 
themes; fourth, the themes were then re-worked until each theme was distinctive in its own right. 
Following this stage the authors then re-consulted the literature and concluded the analysis by 
assigning a name to our themes which captured the overall ‘story’ each was telling.60 
A central part of our contribution is the development of an ideal type of soft power that will be 
of use to both academics and practitioners alike. An ideal type is, of course, a construct that 
represents an intellectual description of a phenomenon in its abstract form and does not provide 
us with explanations. What follows should not be understood as an ‘ideal’ standard ‘in the sense 
of being perfect, but rather that it is “ideal” in the sense of being an intellectual construct that 
may never exist in the real world’.61 Rather, an ideal type is a conceptualisation with which the 
researcher can compare reality on the ground (empirical evidence). Ideal types are thus 
hypothetical constructs formed by emphasising aspects of behaviour and institutions which are 
(generally) empirically observable. These constructs isolate ‘those variables central to the study of 
a problem, putting aside those aspects of the reality which seem inessential to the analysis’.62 This 
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ideal type has been developed through an iterative process between concepts and empirical data 
across a number of cases, as stated above, including non-Western states (Brazil, Qatar, Russia) 
and Western states (UK, Germany, Canada). Two key points ought to be noted at this juncture: 
first, the purpose of an ideal type is to be parsimonious. By definition this will mean that there 
will be a number of aspects that are not included in our model; second, our purpose is not to 
advance a ‘theory’ of soft power or an explanatory framework for predicting outcomes, but 
rather to produce a tool that can be used and adapted by researchers looking at a variety of states 
and their soft power strategies. 
Towards an ‘Ideal Type’ of a States’ Soft Power Package  
This section introduces the ideal type of soft power and the domains within which they are likely 
to be found. The two ‘test cases’63 – one actual SME (FIFA 2006 World Cup) and one longer-
term sports diplomatic strategy (by Qatar) – are drawn from sport for two, simple reasons. First, 
sport is an under-researched yet fruitful area for soft power/diplomacy research; both political 
science and international relations as disciplines are bereft of in-depth studies using 
sport/sporting events as part of a nation’s soft power strategy.64 Some slow progress has been 
made since Taylor suggested in 1986 that IR and sport suffer from a case of ‘mutual neglect’.65 
Sports studies literature more broadly has begun to engage with the political and diplomatic use 
of sport. SMEs, in particular, are considered as significant soft power opportunities, acting as 
major contributions in the process of improving their nation’s image, profiling and showcasing 
themselves globally and ‘attracting’ others.66 International sporting success, whether by athletic 
competition or by the effective staging of SMEs, is said to provide the perfect opportunity for 
states who seek to ‘attract’ others with their values and culture and persuade them to want what 
they want by projecting speciﬁc images, principles, achievements and visions to foreign publics.67 
The second key reason why sporting test cases were chosen is that sport and sports events play a 
role in all five of the (interlinked) ‘resources’ that appear essential in a state’s successful soft 
power strategy (see figure 2 below). First, is the resource of ‘Culture’ – to which ‘SMEs’ belong. 
A state’s culture is often central to making a state more attractive to others, one of the reasons 
states such as Germany and China invest heavily in language institutes abroad; art, heritage, 
history and literature fall under this category too and are often leveraged to improve a state’s 
global standing. The UK’s World Service acts as a cultural conduit exemplifying the global reach 
of English as a language and the British values of democracy and fair news reporting.68 
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Figure 1: Soft Power ‘Resources’ 
The second resource, ‘Tourism’, is closely linked with both ‘Branding’ and ‘Diplomacy’ (the third 
and fourth resources respectively) and serves the purpose of attracting foreigners to a state, 
bringing with them business for the tourist industry; equally, satisfied tourists can act as 
multipliers passing on positive messages about the host country on their return, something 
reported to have happened in Germany’s case through hosting the 2006 FWC.69 ‘Branding’, the 
third resource, takes aspects such as ‘tourism’ and ‘culture’ and attempts to package them to ‘sell’ 
a country externally. Van Ham suggests that such state branding is an attempt to gain prestige on 
the world stage.70 
Diplomacy is a broad resource that entails formal state-to-state relations, but also encompasses 
the multitude of actors now involved in diplomatic relations. Public diplomacy studies 
differentiate between the ‘old’ modus operandi via ‘hierarchical state-centric structures’ on the 
one hand and the ‘new’ model of a ‘network environment’ in which several actors, of which the 
state is but one, undertake public diplomacy.71 One can also speak of a growing ‘sports’ 
diplomacy - that is, the use of sport to achieve diplomatic ends. Whereas a few well-known 
examples of sport being used as an ‘ice-breaker’ in diplomatic affairs are regularly cited (e.g. the 
‘ping-pong’ diplomacy between the US and China), a wide range of regime types are now signing 
up to host a SME to signal their arrival on the world stage. Recent examples include the ‘BRICS’ 
states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Qatar and Aserbaidschan. 
Finally, the ‘Trade’ resource is straightforward: states use all of the resources discussed above to 
increase their global trade and grow their economies; this can entail finding new markets within 
which to sell products they manufacture or to sell their own ‘goods’ such as financial services. 
SMEs are often used to send out a ‘signal’ that a state has the requisite infrastructure and 
logistical know-how to do business at the highest and most efficient level; the construction of 
sporting sites themselves often lead to extensive flows of human capital between states.  
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Taken together, the five domains highlighted above constitute the areas within which states 
attempt to gain soft power. Clearly, some of the components of the ideal type above are 
relatively constant, for example, ‘art’, ‘language’, ‘national identity’ and ‘values and morals’. Other 
components can be stimulated by key events, such as an SME. The latter can kick-start tourism, 
impact diplomatic relations and affect trade relations. Any success in these areas then becomes 
part of the nation’s ‘branding’. Australia, for example, understands and brands itself as a 
‘sporting nation’, despite the fact that they suffer high levels of obesity. The Australian Tourist 
Commission suggested that the Sydney Olympics in 2000 ‘accelerated development of brand 
Australia by 10 years’.72 Of interest to the discussion here is that ‘sport’ (including SMEs) cross-
cuts all of the domains outlined. ‘Sport’ is part of a nation’s cultural make-up. The majority of 
mainstream sports today began life in England in the late 19th century; sports were spread across 
the world (in great part through the British Empire) and now stand as a cultural, universal 
language (i.e. association football (‘soccer’) shares the same rules throughout the world). SMEs 
are major tourist attractions – although net tourist gains are often off-set by ‘regular’ tourists 
remaining at home. Nonetheless, sports events often ‘force’ fans to visit places they would 
otherwise not; this can lead to repeat visits and the ‘multiplier’ effect – returning home and 
telling others of the good time spent in the host country. Nation’s and cities are often branded 
through sporting events (see Qatar below). Canada has become ‘addicted’ to hosting SMEs,73 for 
example, in an attempt to showcase itself globally. Finally, SMEs are often used as an arena to 
show diplomatic solidarity (but also disunity) between states.  
The next section offers a brief overview of how the ideal type above could be applied to an 
empirical case.  
 
Germany’s Soft Power Strategy: the 2006 FIFA World Cup  
Germany’s hosting of the 2006 World Cup offers an excellent example of how a state can 
actively seek to make themselves both more attractive and more influential on the world stage. 
The following is necessarily brief and focuses on just some short examples from the ‘resources’ 
highlighted in the ideal type above. A desk officer at the German Foreign Office set out their 
position in relation to cultural foreign policy: 
We spend almost a quarter of the whole budget for foreign policy on culture which is more 
than 700 million Euros....this is the long-term promotion of ‘soft power’....we want to bring 
people together....and sport is one part of this [promotion of Germany’s culture]’74 
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 Figure 2: Germany’s Soft Power ‘Package’ (2006) 
Germany wasted no time in implementing its ‘World Cup Hosting Strategy’75 with the express 
purpose of improving its poor image abroad. Overcoming negative stereotypes, it was believed, 
would lead to an increase in in-coming tourism and position Germany as an economic and 
scientific country to trade with.76 The German government also wanted Germany to be seen as a 
nation of culture (‘Kulturnation’) and its people to be known for more than just being ‘punctual, 
reliable and disciplined’.77 
The German strategy resulted in a long-term, carefully planned, coordinated and implemented 
set of actions designed to change the national ‘image’ of Germany among foreign publics. The 
‘strategies’ in figure 2 above take place in the resources identified in the authors’ soft power ideal 
type: the cultural augmentation strategy greatly increased the international scope of Germany’s 
World Cup through showing projects in 40 different countries and 87 different international 
cities.78 According to Green79 such ‘augmentation’ – that is, putting on activities, entertainment 
and services over and beyond the event itself – enhances and broadens the appeal of an event. In 
preparation to receive tourists, a number of campaigns were specifically designed to prepare 
Germany and the Germans to be hospitable to the crowds of foreign visitors that were expected 
for the competition.80 One of the latter was the ‘Nation-wide Service and Hospitality Campaign’ 
which published millions of brochures and held numerous workshops.81 The tourism industry 
seems to have benefitted from the four-week tournament, allegedly earning ‘an extra 300 million 
Euros in revenue...’82 The ‘Branding’ resource was headed up by the ‘Land of Ideas’ campaign,  
launched in 2006 and designed to improve the German national image by showcasing Germany 
and attracting tourism and foreign investment. It was so successful that it continues to this day, 
bringing together key actors from business, science and culture, and facilitating the promotion of 
Germany’s image externally.83  
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The diplomatic resource put into the 2006 World Cup extends to efforts to win the event in the 
first place (rumours of high-level bribery came to light in the most recent FIFA scandal), to 
securing the success of the event. The Foreign Office (FO) pursued an overall ‘cultural 
diplomacy’ strategy, within which sport diplomacy took centre stage. The German FO worked 
closely with the Organising Committee and organized a whistle-stop ‘welcome tour’ for Franz 
Beckenbauer, the Committee’s Chair, to all 31 countries qualified for the tournament. According 
to the Vice Chair of the Committee, Horst R. Schmidt, ‘we received a high-level reception [in all 
31 countries; Grix, 2013]; he went to the countries to welcome them to Germany....this greatly 
influenced the media coverage of the event positively...’84 
On trade, the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK) in their 
report indicated that  
the most important economic stimulus was due to a greater willingness among Germans and 
foreign football fans to spend money. Almost 50% of all businesses who reported a positive 
effect from the FWC also reported increased sales in this context...85 
Economically, the 2006 event appears to have paid off. The 2 million foreign tourists who 
travelled to Germany during the month-long tournament are estimated to have spent 600 million 
euros.86 While it is notoriously difficult to find accurate data on the exact economic impact of the 
FWC on a nation’s economy, half of the companies who reported a positive ‘FWC’ effect on 
their business thought the gain in reputation of Germany and its products was ‘the underlying 
reason for the economic success of this mega event’.87 This ‘reputational gain’, while hard to 
calculate, is clearly part of a successful soft power strategy.  
It is clear that the above ‘resources’ identified overlap: an augmentation plan involving arts, 
heritage and history is designed to attract tourists (‘Tourism’ resource) and to get them to stay 
longer and spend more money (‘Trade’). It also greatly adds to the ‘Branding’ resource – 
Germany’s cultural history as the ‘land of poets and thinkers’ helps sell it as a tourist destination. 
Equally, part of the reason Germany’s soft power strategy worked well was because of wealth: 
hardly any resources were spent on ‘infrastructure’ (building roads, transport systems, stadia), as 
these were already present and at a very high standard. Thus, resources could be re-directed into 
the type of campaigns discussed here.  
 
Qatar’s Soft Power Ambitions through Sport Diplomacy  
This section applies the ideal type to the case of Qatar and its soft power strategy via sport 
diplomacy. Due to its abundance of wealth, predominantly from the sale of crude oil and 
liquefied natural gas, Qatar is able to invest heavily in the acquisition of soft power through 
sports diplomacy. Qatar’s nominal GDP per capita is almost double that of Germany’s 
(US$93,965 compared to roughly US$47,589)88 and, relative to many states, a substantial 
proportion of this wealth has been invested in various sporting endeavours.89 Based on the 
authors’ various engagements with Qatari authorities and relevant documents, the argument is 
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that Qatar’s soft power objectives through sport rest upon the mechanisms of culture, tourism, 
branding, diplomacy and trade (see figure 3). It should be noted, however, that as Qatar’s 
engagements with global sport are fairly recent, the actual soft power outcomes have yet to fully 
materialize, and, therefore, the paper offers only the intended outcomes that Qatari authorities 
seek to achieve. 
 
Figure 3: Qatar’s Soft Power Sports Package 
One of the Qatari authority’s central objectives through sport is to debunk various negative 
cultural stereotypes, most particularly the ‘orientalist’ connotations of Arabs as static, 
undeveloped and lazy.90 In this sense, authorities see the hosting of SMEs that attract 
international audiences - such as the 2019 IAAF World Championships and the 2022 World Cup 
- as the most suitable vehicles through which to ‘create better understandings between the East 
and the West’.91 Most specifically here, Qatari authorities seek to ‘signal’ the ability of Arabs and 
Qataris to handle the logistical complexities of hosting major sports events. In addition, such 
events offer an ideal international showcase to their capacity for creating and implementing 
innovative and state-of-the-art technologies: the state’s achievements in designing carbon-
neutral, environmentally friendly cooling technology for the 2022 World Cup is a case in point.92 
Enhancing inward tourism is closely linked to debunking stereotypes, as in the German case 
study. At present, Qatar’s tourism trends are mostly made up by those who travel to the state 
predominantly for various short-term conferences and business seminars.93 According to Qatari 
authorities, one reason the state fails to attract longer-term holiday-makers is due to the 
continuous inaccurate media portrayal of the Middle East as a homogenous region plagued by 
conflict and civil strife. Thus, hosting SMEs is one way in which to ‘educate international 
audiences of the differences between us [Qatar] and many of our regional [Middle Eastern] 
neighbours’94. The intention is also to show that the state is a safe and peaceful tourist 
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destination. The hoped-for outcome here is the desire to attract longer-term holiday makers who 
will provide the state with a much needed revenue stream once its crude oil reserves diminish.95 
The ‘Branding’ resource sets out to raise awareness of Qatar - its location, history, culture and 
achievements. Two examples stand out here: the first is the Qatar Foundation’s original €170 
million deal with FC Barcelona in 2010 to become the club’s shirt sponsor, the first ever 
commercial sponsorship of the FC Barcelona shirt; and second is the 2013 agreement with FC 
Barcelona for Qatar Airways to replace the Qatar Foundation’s original agreement. Sponsorship 
of one of the globe’s largest sporting brands looks to raise international awareness of what 
Qatari has achieved in a short space of time: the Qatar Foundation’s ‘Education City’ plays host 
to the largest enclave of American universities outside the US, and has thus converted Doha into 
one of the leading educational hubs across the Middle East;96 and Qatar Airways has established 
itself as one of the fastest growing airlines in the world.97  
The diplomatic resource includes the regular accommodating of sports conferences and athletic 
talent. The Doha Goals Forum, for example, annually invites hundreds of sports academics and 
athletes to Doha to discuss and debate the role of sport for economic and social progress; the 
Aspire Academy of Sport Excellence’s Football Dreams Initiative acts as an elite development 
programme, wherein ‘annually over 600,000 boys from across the world…undergo preliminary 
trials, with the best candidates being invited back to Doha for expert training’98; and the 
Academy’s sports medicine hospital, ‘ASPETAR’, welcomes a plethora of elite athletes each year 
to provide specialist expertise and treatment. In all such cases, the Qatari authorities look to 
transform the country, and the capital, Doha, into a key international centre for dialogue, 
research and training.99  
With regard to trade, Qatar has invested heavily abroad in a number of different areas, including 
multiple international sporting acquisitions. Most well-known is the Qatar Sports Investments’ 
acquisition of Paris Saint-Germain in 2012. In the same year, Qatar Sports Investments also 
purchased the French Ligue 1 television rights; broadcasting under the name ‘beIN Sports’, the 
network now holds the rights to transmit live sport in ‘Hong Kong, the US, Canada, Australia 
and Indonesia’100. And finally Qatari Diar purchased a large part of the London 2012 Olympic 
Village, now known as ‘East Village’. Qatari Diar, the real-estate wing of the Qatar Investment 
Authority, purchased the land in 2011 and is, along with other major stake-holders, Delancey, 
transforming the complex into luxury housing.101 Apart from the obvious long-term financial 
investment the state wishes to recoup, such projects also look to demonstrate Qatar’s acumen in 
the areas of business, finance and real-estate.  
Taken together, Qatar draws strongly on all five areas identified in the idea type with the express 
purpose of improving its standing on the international stage. As is well documented, the hosting 
of a sports event as part of this strategy can also backfire: by inviting the amount of media 
attention that a global sporting event attracts, a state is challenging insatiable 24 hour media to 
scrutinize its modus operandi. In Germany’s case the global media witnessed a well-run, 
carnivalesque festival of sport enjoyed by a variety of cultures with very few problems; Qatar, 
however, has had an avalanche of poor media coverage around its dealings with foreign 
construction workers and the extraordinary employer-employee relations that exist.     
17 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly further research is needed to develop the ideal type of soft power put forward in this 
paper. However, the attempt has been made to partially fill a major gap in the literature by 
offering a start to the debate on grounding soft power in empirical research. The latter was 
drawn from a test-case of Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup and Qatar’s sport 
diplomacy strategy. There has not been adequate space to develop the linkages between the 
‘resources’ highlighted in the ideal type: Culture, Tourism, Branding, Diplomacy and Trade. Yet, 
it is clear that these areas overlap and several institutions – for example, the Foreign Office in the 
UK – seek to promote all in the work that they, and their sponsored organisations do.102 The 
significance of this piece lies in the attempt to spell out soft power resources, which then allow 
researchers and policy makers to consider the potential gains and draw-backs of strategies 
designed to win over opinion abroad and make states more attractive to others. Such an ideal 
type is useful as a starting point in understanding how and why states seek to influence others 
using sport diplomacy and SMEs. It is clear that not all states seek a soft power strategy as put 
forward in this article. Some, like Russia, for example, confound the standard rationale and do 
not fit the ideal type. Rather than rendering the ideal type problematic, such ‘outliers’ can be 
understood better, if researchers know in which way they differ from the mainstream.103 Debates 
on and around the empirical aspects of ‘soft power’ are to be encouraged and it is hoped that 
this article has been able to persuade scholars of the value of studying sport diplomacy and 
SMEs in order to shed light on their role in a “politics of attraction”.  
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